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Abstract
Whether present in abundance or known for its scarcity, water defines the regional and
geographical identities of people. It defines political and ecological boundaries globally. Water
paucity and quality in burgeoning populations has been a catalyst for creative resource
management policies. Conservation of water resources, in practice, has still not improved
however. As a result, the health and stability of the Great Lakes as a natural resource is
threatened. The Great Lakes region includes two countries, eight states, two provinces, and over
200 tribal and native influences. International agreements, such as the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909 (BWT) and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) beginning in 1972,
have attempted to define responsibilities for broad water issues. So what are the best ways to
manage such a vital element? Management institutions created from such agreements and treaties
have struggled to handle the diversity of issues for various reasons. Meanwhile, local-level
efforts emerged to address specific local concerns. The role of such efforts is examined, using
interdisciplinary historical analysis and comparative case studies, in relation to the GLWQA. The
place and function of different forms of local-level efforts are incorporated into this study to
provide depth. The resulting analysis reveals that these forms of conservation have produced
encouraging progress and results. Strengthened efforts must be made to cultivate further
community involvement as a way to achieve the goals set out in international policy and bridge
the philosophical dichotomy of thinking globally, and acting locally.
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I. Introduction
The United States and Canada share the longest border in the world of over 5,500 miles
(Fry, 2005). This border is defined by rivers, lakes and watersheds, from the St. Lawrence
Seaway in the east, to the border between Alaska and the Yukon in the northwest. It is anchored
in the Midwest by the Great Lakes Basin (Figure 1, below). The sustainability and health of this
watershed is challenged by alien invasive species, population growth and more. Around forty
million people call this region home, a population that depends on the Great lakes to support its
economy and identity. The fishing industry alone accounts for $3.5 billion while the shipping
industry contributes another $3 billion. The waters also support a growing tourism industry, with
hunting, recreational boating, and recreational fishing each worth over $2 billion to the economy.
The water found in the Great Lakes Basin also supports over 30% of the United States‟ and over
25% of Canada‟s agriculture (IJC, 2005). Water management practices remain a contentious
issue facing institutions in both social and political spheres.
Concerns over water quantity and its availability as a resource for human use were first
addressed in a comprehensive manner with the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 (BWT). It took
fifty years for water pollution to reach a level of concern warranting binational political
attention. The Great Lakes Information Network defines water pollution as “a change in the
chemical, physical and biological health of a waterway due to human activity” (GLIN). Human
activity near Cleveland, Ohio became the source of the spark that the Great Lakes region needed
to capture that political attention on an international level. In June of 1969, a tributary of Lake
Erie, the Cuyahoga River literally caught fire. As a result, the political efficacy of water pollution
gained momentum rapidly, resulting in the Clean Water Act of 1970 and most importantly, the
first edition of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement with Canada in 1972.
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The Basin includes the Government of Québec and Province of Ontario in Canada, while
in America, the states of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and New
York, as well as the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Over 200 Native American, metis, and
tribal governments also influence the region. This political arrangement is illustrated below in
Figure 1. The primary bodies of water are Lake Michigan, Lake Superior, Lake Huron, Lake
Erie, Lake Ontario, Lake St. Clair, the St. Clair River, Detroit River, and the St. Lawrence River.
The fact that these states, provinces, and countries are each made up of communities and
municipalities is important to the Basin‟s social and political dynamics.

Figure 1. Great Lakes Basin Boundaries
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People tend to identify more strongly with and value higher the issues that affect
themselves and their community (Schultz, 2012). For this reason, among other factors, organized
forms of community-based action have developed. Significant motivation to create such an
institution may arise from the sentiment that intimate knowledge of an issue will lead to more
efficient, motivated, and direct solutions. They become neighborhood associations, political
advocacy groups, and environmental groups. “Between the early and mid-twentieth century,
New Zealand, England and Wales, the United States, and Canada established agencies to address
regional environmental, social and economic issues” (Shrubsole, 1996). Locally oriented water
conservation exists in various forms also. In Ontario, Conservation Authorities are established
primarily around a local watershed, which serves as the principal management unit and is clearly
definable geographically. Other examples include watershed councils and conservation districts.
In the context of this research, such locally supported, issue-based institutions are categorized as
local-level conservation mechanisms.
Community involvement forms the basis of grassroots efforts and bottom-up
management approaches. The 1992 Earth Summit resulted in new ideas on water quality and
freshwater resource management approaches. In order to implement these ideas, “several
management principles were adopted in Agenda 21” (Shrubsole, 1996). The essentials of locallevel conservation mechanisms were included within Agenda 21 with “a „bottom-up‟ approach of
putting emphasis upon people, communities and NGOs; the need for „open governance;‟ the
importance of adequate information” (Shrubsole, 1996). Hans van Ginkel remarks that “We have
to learn how to move fluidly between the global and local in the present world” and “At the end
of the day it‟s about people taking responsibility for their own future” (Glasser, 2008).
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This research strives to answer important questions concerning water resource
management in the Great Lakes. The role of local-level conservation mechanisms in addressing
environmental issues concerning the region is examined. As something to simply consider, can
further local-level involvement contribute in bridging the dichotomous gap between thinking
globally and acting locally in environmental issues? The analysis and research are not
necessarily intended to form a policy change; rather, they wish to guide future implementation of
the goals and intentions found in environmental policies. Thus, the foundational question of this
work is: What is the role of local-level conservation mechanisms in effective implementation of
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement?
II. Approach & Methods
Broad historical research, case studies, and comparative analysis are used to
illustrate conclusions. The historical work is largely derived from scholarly articles, government
documents, as well as documents from local-level conservation mechanisms/institutions. The
case studies are supported by annual reports & budgets, government documents, newspaper
articles, and more scholarly articles. The work here is applied comparatively in discussion.
The interdisciplinary historical research creates a foundational background that provides
context for both the case studies and the discussion. It covers the federalist and cultural
differences between the United States and Canada, at the national, state/provincial, and local
levels. The relevant water resource management history between the two countries is also
included. The genesis and evolution of local-level conservation mechanisms rounds out the base
of the background research. Specific focus is placed on non-profits, conservation districts, and
conservation authorities, which form the vehicular examples of the case studies. The functions
and motivation of such institutions are further investigated. Explanation follows on how all of
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these components merge in relation to the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement and to water
conservation questions of this work.
The three case studies provide specific examples of local-level mechanisms to provide
illustration to the historical research. Conservation Authorities in Ontario, Conservation Districts
in Michigan, and a Northern Michigan non-profit are used as examples of local-level
mechanisms of water conservation. The Upper Thames River Conservation Authority (UTRCA),
the Muskegon Conservation District (MCD), and the Tip of the Mitt Watershed Council (TOM)
are the specific institutions chosen. All three bear a commonality in their local-level scope.
However, they differ in their authority, responsibilities, orientation, and legal function. The case
studies are structured in a method to reduce such variation and then analyze them based on what
they do share. Each is illustrated through the study of a project taken up by the institution. The
institutions are then analyzed through a couple of metrics that apply to all three. The analysis is
based on the institution‟s accountability, funding sources and use, and partnership building.
The results of the case studies are applied to the historical contexts in the Discussion section.
Specific applications are made to the gaps in the GLWQA‟s effectiveness. Conclusions are
drawn, based on the comparisons, and enumerated in the final section of this work.

1. Groups Evaluated:

2. Measures Evaluated On:

Organization Type Organization
Non-Profit
TOM
Conservation District
MCD
Conservation Authority
UTRCA

Metrics of Effective Groups
Definition
Funding
Where From, How Used?
Partnerships
How Made, How Many, To What Purpose?
Accountability
To Who? For What?
Motivations
Why Do What They Do?

3. Applied in Relation To:
Based On These Measures:

GLWQA Goals
1. Free of Polluting Sources; Directly or Indirectly Human
2. Free of Nutrients Interfering with Beneficial UsesRelation To:
And Applied in Relation To:
3. Free of Unsightly Debris, Floating Material

4. Determine
Implementation
Effectiveness

Figure 2. Methodology Flow Chart
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III. History of Great Lakes Water Management
In order to understand the setting in which the GLWQA and water pollution interact, a
number of other elements involved are important to know. Also important are the various levels
of power and influence at work in the Basin. This includes the political and professional
participants. Understanding who and what are involved, at the level they are involved, and the
relationship between them provides a basis to recognize the issues of water pollution in the Great
Lakes under the GLWQA. It further allows an illustration to base the inclusion of local-level
conservation mechanisms off.
a. Brief Differences in the Governments of Canada and the United States
Canada and the United States share a common language, the longest border in the world,
and the Great Lakes. The number of similarities among the cultures and people extend to a level
taken for granted, and often naively assumed. The differences are typically forgotten by those in
the United States and celebrated in Canada. The differences are reflected in the political
relationship between the two governments. The differences can also be seen in the structural
make-up of the two governments and their departments and agencies.
Canada and the United States are both federalist governments, with constitutions that
delegate powers to the levels of actors in each country. It is interesting that the U.S. constitution
was conceived under constant reminders of the dangers of a central government that could grow
too strong. A select choice of powers was given to the federal government, with anything not
specifically named to fall to the authority of the states. As this was interpreted over time, the
federal government of the U.S. has expanded its original powers exponentially. On the other
hand, the Canadian constitution was “originally designed to create a strong central government
and a clear division of responsibilities and jurisdictions, is today distinguished by powerful
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provinces and overlapping federal-provincial jurisdictions” (Inscho, Durfee, 1995). While the
U.S. constitution “gives the federal government clear and extensive authority in international
relations,” (Inscho, Durfee, 1995) the Canadian constitution is structured in a way that
“execution of international agreements may depend on the passage of implementing legislation
by provincial parliaments” (Inscho, Durfee, 1995). Implications of these differences are seen in
the Great Lakes.
The Canadian constitution does not include delineation of powers on the environment.
“Because responsibility for environmental protection and remediation does not clearly lie with
either the federal or the provincial government, the question of responsibility for resolving”
environmental issues in the Great Lakes are left unanswered (Inscho, Durfee, 1995). This has
resulted in a number of agreements between the federal government and the provincial
government in order to create cooperation. When it came time to enter the GLWQA in 1972 – an
international agreement – Canada had such domestic struggles to address in conjunction to the
foreign affairs. This was “because responsibility for their implementation falls between „the
classes of subjects‟ given to the federal government and those given to the provinces” (Inscho,
Durfee, 1995). As an example, Ontario is “responsible for „near-shore‟ lake waters and for the
lake floor, while the federal government is responsible for the open lakes, international pollution,
and some federal harbors” (Inscho, Durfee, 1995). Overall, the provinces in Canada have more
of a capacity to influence foreign affairs than states in the U.S. because Canadian “federalism
places considerable emphasis on provincial (rather than national) power” (Inscho, Durfee, 1995).
Canada must listen to the voice of the provinces in creating international agreements. Since the
provinces have so much more power relative to the states as a result of constitutional vagaries,
they can in effect refuse to implement obligations of an international agreements that concern,
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for example, natural resources. The U.S. does not need to consult with its states as much because
of its power to delegate standards to them. It is still important to at least understand the dynamics
of the affected states in an international agreement as “the states may be needed to implement
federal international obligations” (Inscho, Durfee, 1995).
Environment Canada (EC) is the federal agency responsible for the environment in
Canada, while in the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible.
In terms of water management, EC does not set water standards for all of Canada, the provinces
do. Under the Canadian constitutions of 1867 and 1982, the federal government must recognize
the predominance of the provinces (Fry, 2005). So with water, the Canadian federal government
and EC must approach water from the understanding that the water belongs to the provinces
(Allee, 1995). For example, under the GLWQA, which is detailed later, the national government
in Ottawa deferred to Ontario and Quebec to implement the terms of the agreement. The EPA on
the other hand, is responsible for setting national water pollution standards in the United States,
but water rights and law are primarily the responsibility of the states. Another consequence is
large amounts of top-down attempts at coordination from federal level institutions like the EPA.
“The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Geological
Survey, and 13 other federal agencies, for example, conduct more than 140 national and regional
monitoring programs, ranging from national monitoring networks to site-specific research
projects” (Christen, 2004). Since the EPA does not maintain regional, state, or local offices, any
local management of a resource is done through local offices of other agencies. For example, the
EPA will work with the Army Corps of Engineers in dealing with wetland protection but the Soil
Conservation Service for non-point pollution sources (Allee, 1995).
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In both countries, the municipal governments derive their powers from the state and
provincial governments. The countries differ however in the way they delegate those powers.
The provinces hold onto much of the power, delegating little outside of the bigger cities, and
typically prefer to setup boards and commissions to address issues instead of delegating
functions to local governments. This includes functions such as community planning, public
health, and conservation. Allee further argues that:
Provincial governments are more likely than state to think and act in terms of
communities and sub-regions. Nongovernmental organizations have emerged to
carry out in rural areas many of the tasks that governments would perform in the
United States. They create incentives for individual action and facilitate
community decision making, roles more often expected of local governments in
the United States (1995).
The differences here play out in water resource management too. In Ontario, conservation
authorities have addressed watershed protection since the 1940s. The protection is heavily driven
by the local communities in the different watersheds. They establish the boundaries of the areas
they wish to protect and then form a “conservation authority” specifically responsible. This is
similar to the International Joint Commission‟s (IJC) process of establishing Areas of Concern
(AOCs). They are both approaches that encourage localized, community involved management.
In the United States the approach is less proactive, although similar institutions do exist as
Conservation Districts.
There seems to be more innate capacity for the development of local-level conservation
mechanisms in Ontario as a result of Canada‟s federal and cultural orientations. This is evident
historically, as the province‟s “conservation authorities were the first provincial agencies to
incorporate provincial conservation programs with local resource management concerns”
(Cardwell, 1996). More on the history of local-level conservation is discussed later, but it is
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worth noting now that the differing outlooks of each country are evident from their ideas on
conservation. The outlook in Canada definitely suggests more openness to local participation.
There are multiple levels of citizen participation and awareness when it comes to the Great Lakes
issues in Ontario. Inscho and Durfee provide three, the first of which being “those citizens who
take an interest only when dramatic events or their individual self-interest drives them to do so.
Although this segment is large…it generally lacks cohesion, sophistication, and leadership to be
effective over the long term” (1995). They go on to name established environmental interest
groups as the second level and those that have been involving Remedial Action Plans (RAPs) for
Great Lakes AOCs. In short, the U.S. conservation movement was characterized by a
dichotomous choice between utilitarian and preservationist perspectives. In Canada, the
conservation movement was marked by a comprehensive perspective. It was one that embraced
the importance of natural resources to the economy and the opportunity to create jobs in a
difficult time while also thoroughly recognizing that without preservationist conservation,
economic motivations would be mute.
It is also important to comment on the current economic relationship between Canada and
the United States. Earl Fry notes that the two countries have the largest bilateral trading
relationship in the world, a relationship worth roughly $1.2 Billion a day (2005). A tremendous
amount of this trade occurs in and depends on the waters of the Great Lakes. Fry further
concludes:
In spite of the major differences in outlook among the citizens of the two
neighbouring countries, one should anticipate that transgovernmental linkages
involving provincial, state, and municipal governments will continue to
proliferate, a direct result of the thick network of cross-border interdependence
which continues to expand (2005).
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The economic relationship here should be remembered by policy makers and enforcers
attempting to ameliorate the Great Lakes of pollution. Those expanding relationships among
subnational governments can be utilized to facilitate a more efficient environmental relationship.
“Implementing GLWQA, however, requires concerted and concrete actions…Such problems
require a longer lasting and more narrowly focused mechanism” (Inscho, Durfee, 1995).
b. History of Relevant Agreements and Treaties
The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 (BWT) was the first agreement to address the
management of the Basin‟s water. The IJC was established under this treaty with jurisdiction
over all waters existing in all or in part along the border. Over three hundred areas along this
border classify as trans-boundary waters. This jurisdiction was in fact fairly limited though in
scope. For example, the IJC had no jurisdiction in Lake Michigan since it is not technically
boundary water, even though it connects and shares a watershed with true boundary waters. The
key reason here is that the BWT addresses water quantity almost exclusively, meaning water
levels and flows, and it does not concern water quality with any significance. The scope of
jurisdiction for BWT also does not include underground water or tributaries. The BWT has since
been complimented with the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 1972 and 1978, as well
as a protocol amendment in 1987 (GLWQA). These all attempted to address issues of water
quality like pollution, toxins, and ecosystem health.
The Great Lakes Charter of 1985 (Charter) focused on the Basin as one, interconnected
system and recognized that water withdrawal and diversion decisions must consider this element.
The Charter is only a good-faith agreement however, meaning it has no legal or binding authority
(Bielecki, 2007). The success and implementation of the Charter depends entirely on the
commitment of the signatories, the governors and premiers.
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In 1986, the United States enacted the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA). This
requires the unanimous consent of Great Lakes governors for any diversion to be made out of the
Basin. The issue with WRDA is that it provides no standards to analyze existing diversions on,
no process to review a proposed diversion, and no process to challenge a proposal decision. The
Great lakes Charter Annex of 2001 (Annex) formed a new, good-faith agreement that attempted
to reconcile the issues of both WRDA and the original Charter of 1985. It provided a standard for
reviewing all withdrawals, not only diversions.
All of these contributed to the formation of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Water Resources Sustainability Agreement and Compact in 2005 (Compact). It bans all new
diversions, as well as any proposals to increase existing diversions. It guarantees the use of a
consistent standard of review and process to evaluate proposals. The Compact and Agreement
create clear and detailed goals and objectives for regions within the basin. Another aspect of the
compact is that it encourages and stresses the importance of public involvement in preserving
and protecting the region‟s water. Since the Compact and Agreement are binding and legal, they
are great progress from the voluntary nature of the previous good-faith agreements. The
Agreement has been enacted by both Ontario and Quebec on the Canadian side while the
Compact has been ratified by all eight Great Lakes states. All eight states have also passed the
complimentary legislation to begin enacting all of the Compact‟s provisions. The United States
Congress passed the Compact in 2008, making the Compact and Agreement official legislation.
The permanent nature of these agreements addresses issues of enforceability, regional stability,
and uniformity in decision making for the Great Lakes Basin. The Great Lakes Compact and
Agreement focus on an ecosystem based approach to water quantity management. Like the
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GLWQA, the Compact and Agreement supplement the BWT and do not change it (Bielecki,
2007). Great Lakes water pollution is still addressed entirely separately through the GLWQA.
c. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
Canada and the United States attempt to simplify this web under the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement (GLWQA) by treating the Basin as one ecosystem and system. Specifically,
Article I, sub-paragraph (g) defines “Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem” structurally as “the
interacting components of air, land, water and living organisms, including humans, within the
drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River at or upstream from the point at which this river
becomes the international boundary between Canada and the United States” (GLWQA, 1978).
This ecosystem is further defined geographically in Article I, sub-paragraph (h), stating that
“‟Great Lakes System‟ means all of the streams, rivers, lakes and other bodies of water that are
within the drainage basin on the St. Lawrence River at or upstream from the point at which this
river becomes the international boundary between Canada and the United States” (GLWQA,
1978).
The basics of the GLWQA are defined and settled in its two initial articles. As referenced
above in the introduction, Article I provides definitions of terms as well as defines the focus of
the agreement politically, structurally, and geographically. For example, it elaborates the
meaning behind a “Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem” and the “Great Lakes System.” Article II
establishes the purpose of the agreement and the commitment of the two governments. In order
to achieve their goals, Canada and the United States:
Agree to make maximum effort to develop programs, practices and technology
necessary for a better understanding of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem and to
eliminate or reduce to the maximum extent practicable the discharge or pollutants
into the Great Lakes System. (GLWQA, 1978)
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They further institute in this section, as policy, a combination of “local, state, provincial, and
federal participation” in order to achieve the scope of success envisioned. The idea of
harmonization among levels of government that is prevalent throughout the agreement is also
established in Article II, in sub-paragraph (c). It reads, “Coordinated planning processes and best
management practices be developed and implemented by the respective jurisdictions to ensure
adequate control of all sources of pollutants” (GLWQA, 1978).
Articles III, IV, and V adopt a set of framing objectives and then elaborate further on the
specific direction of intent. Article III is especially ambitious and represent the salience of water
pollution as an issue at the time of the agreement‟s formation in the 1970s. It makes five
statements as “General Objectives for the Great Lakes System.” The tone of the objectives is
strongly set with heavy use of the word “Free.” The objectives state the Great Lakes System
should be:
1. Free from substances, that as a result of human activity enters the waters both directly
and indirectly. These substances may not adversely affect any aquatic life or
waterfowl, and may not form any unwanted deposits.
2. Free from floating materials that result from the activities of humans that amass to a
level considered “unsightly.” These materials include oil, scum, or any other
undesirable debris.
3. Free from any materials or heat that, again enter the water directly or indirectly, and
due to human activity, could combine to create water issues to an extent that would
interfere with beneficial uses.
4. Free from any materials or heat that, again enter the water directly or indirectly, and
due to human activity, could combine to create water issues that are harmfully toxic
to humans, animals, or any other aquatic life.
5. Free from nutrients that, due to human activity, enter directly or indirectly into the
waters at levels capable of creating growth of aquatic life that may interfere with
beneficial uses.
Number five refers to nutrients such as phosphorous or nitrogen that make their way from
detergents and lawn fertilizers to waters in the Great Lakes System. The rest of the GLWQA‟s
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initiatives, requirements, and goals are created under the guidance of these five general
objectives.
Articles XI through XV are mostly administrative procedures and obligations, but they do
contain a number of implications that are worth noting. Article XI is titled “Implementation” and
is a pivotal passage of the agreement. It strictly requires the Governments of Canada and the
United States to commit to seek three things: appropriating the funds necessary to implement the
agreement, passage of any additional legislation needed to implement agreement elements, and
the cooperation of both state and provincial governments in every matter of relevance to the
GLWQA. Article XII reaffirms the commitments of both governments, as well as the rights
accorded to them in the BWT. Further, the 1987 “protocol explicitly recognized the importance
of the provincial and state governments‟ role in great Lakes protection” (Inscho, Durfee, 1995).
IV. Local-Level Conservation
Local-level conservation mechanisms have an intertwined, evolutionary past. The
conservation movement in the United States influenced the movement in Canada and vice-versa.
At the same time, citizen responses to events in the political conservation movement spawned
organized interest groups. Those same interest groups would later catalyze the creation of new
forms of conservation mechanisms, e.g. conservation authorities. A brief historical background
of some these events are relevant to the comparative applications of this study later.
a. History of Local-Level Conservation Mechanisms
Environmental Interest Groups/Non-profits
Environmental interest groups and movements have historical ties dating back to the mid1800s. The United States established the Department of Interior in the 1850s and by 1875, the
American Forestry Association had formed (Simler, 2001). Other groups, like the Audubon

20

Eriksen 2012
Society also emerged with hopes of protecting “an aspect of aesthetic environmental quality”
(Simler, 2001). Resource management concerns began to replace purely aesthetic ones by the
early 1900s as the availability of resources in an economic context began to raise awareness
among more individuals. This was particularly evident in the interests surrounding forestry,
which became the venue for the debate between Gifford Pinchot and John Muir conservation
philosophies.
Conservation spread into Canada as the degradation of its natural resources became
increasingly apparent. Feeding off the Pinchot and Muir movements, similar directions began
forming in Ontario in the early 1900s. These became various conservation groups dedicated to
the respective issues facing them, such as flooding, depleted forests, and polluted waterways.
Over the years, these organizations grew in number and size across the province. As a result, “In
1931, the Federation of Ontario Naturalists (FON) was established by the union of the province‟s
naturalist clubs. Similarly, in 1936, the Ontario Conservation and Reforestation Association
(OCRA) was formed” (Cardwell, 1996). FON and OCRA would greatly influence the
conservation movement. “In 1936, it became apparent that the different conservation groups,
such as the FON and the OCRA, should work together to achieve their goals” (Cardwell, 1996).
The relationship and partnerships between the conservation organizations in Ontario ultimately
lead to a gathering in London, Ontario in December of that year. The purpose was to consider a
formal union of their partnerships. The conference revealed how much conservation had become
salient within their interests and the push for what would become Ontario‟s conservation
authorities was launched. These interest groups would go “on to play central roles in the
development of Ontario‟s Conservation Authorities Act” (Cardwell, 1996). They formed the
Guelph Conference in 1941, the results of which sparked the selection of the Ganaraska
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Watershed as a pilot study site to determine what sort of conservation efforts would be needed.
By 1944, the Ontario government and its departments had fully taken the lead from Ontario‟s
conservation interest groups and held another conference in London. Two more conferences in
Kingston and Toronto during the two subsequent years produced enough information and results
by 1946 to formulate and pass the legislation that became the Conservation Authorities Act.
Conservation Districts
Official conservation efforts in the U.S. became institutionalized most notably in 1933
with the creation of the Soil Erosion Service, an agency within the Department of Interior. Hugh
Bennett became the first Chief. In 1935, Congress created the Soil Conservation Service as an
agency in the Department of Agriculture. This evolved the Soil Erosion Service into a national
program designed to conserve and develop the United States‟ soil and water resources. This was
especially salient at this time in American history, as the country was in the thick of both the
Great Depression and the Dust Bowl. Hugh Bennett served as chief of the Soil Conservation
Service until 1951 (Natural Resource Conservation Service). President Roosevelt urged state
governors to pass associated legislation in 1937 that would allow the creation of Soil
Conservation Districts. The first such district was organized on August 4th, 1937 in the Brown
Creek Watershed of North Carolina. The Soil Conservation Service became the Natural
Resources Conservation Service in 1994.
In Michigan, the first Conservation District organized in 1937 as well. Before that
however, a few community oriented conservation projects introduced Michiganders to the
resources in their own backyards. In 1934, the first erosion control demonstration project in
Michigan was carried out in Benton Harbor of Berrien County. Three years later a second,
similar demonstration occurred in Howell, Michigan. That same year, the state legislature passed
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Public Act 297 (1937), known as the Michigan Soil Conservation Districts Law. Also in 1937,
the West Ottawa Soil Conservation District was organized as the first Conservation District in
the state. It was the first District organized east of the Mississippi River and north of the Ohio
River in the United States (Natural Resources Conservation Service). The Michigan Association
of Soil Conservation Districts, now simply the MACD, organized on December 9th, 1940 by
leaders of seven soil conservation districts within the state.
Conservation Authorities
Cardwell‟s research reveals the tensions during the beginnings of the conservation
movement in the United States. The contrasting perspectives of Pinchot‟s utilitarian and Muir‟s
preservationist conservation philosophies clashed. The economic desperation of the 1930s
however dictated the conservation paths that ultimately lead to the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) and the Muskingum Conservancy District in 1933. Both institutions were guided by
policies and philosophies that centered on conservation methods that resulted in continued peak
utilization of resources. In Canada, the tensions between Pinchot and Muir ideals were not as
intense (Cardwell, 1996). Cardwell also suggests that there was a “notion that at that time,
conservation in Canada was a means of implementing the best available resource management
strategies in order to reduce the probability of resource depletion and promote the continued
growth of the country‟s resource based economy” (1996).
Canadian officials began to recognize the need to begin planning for the aftermath of
World War II early. They immediately looked to the experiences of the United States‟ New Deal
programs as a possible framework for employing the surge of returning soldiers. “Growing
public awareness regarding the degraded state of the province‟s natural resources in the late
1930s and early 1940s was a second motivating factor for the organization of the Guelph
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Conference” (Cardwell, 1996). The conference took place in 1942 and one of the primary
conclusions reached there recognized that “all the renewable resources of the Province are in an
unhealthy state. None of these natural resources will restore themselves under present conditions,
and the need for far reaching measures of restoration and conservation is acute. Without them,
conditions will get progressively worse” (Cardwell, 1996). The conference also recognized that
an opportunity had presented itself, on the other side of the degradation coin, where efforts to
restore and protect the province‟s natural resources would create the jobs demanded by the
veterans (Cardwell, 1996).
A pilot study of the Ganaraska River watershed was completed in 1943 and then
compiled into The Ganaraska Watershed report. It “identified a wide range of water and landrelated projects” worth addressing. The report goes on to suggest that no one department that
existed at the time had staffing to cover all of the issue disciplines identified. It also suggested
that it was questionable whether the best interests of the community would be served by having a
government department take absolute responsibility (Shrubsole, 1996). Moving forward,
“Ontario officials looked to the experience of the Grand River Conservation Commission, and
toured the Muskingum Conservancy District (Ohio, USA) and the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA, USA) in 1994” (Shrubsole, 1996). The lessons learned by the Ontario officials became
the fundamental principles upon which conservation authorities were designed. The six
principles are “watershed, local initiative, provincial-municipal partnership…a healthy
environment being necessary for a healthy economy, a comprehensive approach, [and]
coordination and cooperation” (Shrubsole, 1996). Of the six principles that create the foundation
of the Conservation Authorities Act and thus the design of the conservation authorities, three are
considered to be the “cornerstones” by scholars. They agree that “the ideology which underlay
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the movement,” the conservation authorities movement, “drew upon three main concepts: local
initiative, cost-sharing arrangements, and watershed jurisdiction” (Cardwell, 1996). The
fundamental simplicity of these concepts was accurate enough that “over time, only minor
adjustments have been seen as being necessary” (Cardwell, 1996).
b. Behavior of Local-Level Conservation Mechanisms
Local-level conservation mechanisms operate in different ways depending on organizational
structure, orientation, and infinitely diverse contextual scenarios. A few core consistencies are
evident though in regards to their importance to an organization, and thus their resultant
behavior. Funding, partnerships, and accountability all drive local-level mechanisms in the form
of motivations and ultimately are recognizable in the form of decisions made. Kirkpatrick, et al
describes decision-making as basically choice behavior that is information-dependent. As a
result, people or groups seek to remove as much uncertainty as possible. Constraints in the form
of information costs, organizational constraints, situational, motive, cognitive, and the group
itself all prevent knowing everything relevant to a decision.
Funding
Funding is dramatically different between forms of local-level conservation mechanisms
but is universally integral. Non-profits must continuously seek out funding and grants, from both
public and private sources. Conservation districts and conservation authorities are not as bound
by this since public funds are either guaranteed or readily available. “The availability of
government funds results in more nonprofit organizations and an increase in the number of large
nonprofit organizations” (Luksetich, 2008). If the availability of government funds results in
more non-profit organizations and an increase in the number of large non-profit organizations,
are non-profits really different than CDs or CAs in their relationship with government? Non-
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profits are not necessarily dependent on government funding but their performance and ability to
“provide some assurance to buyers of the quality of a good or service” is directly related to and
at least partially influenced by that funding (Luksetich, 2008).
Partnerships
Building partnerships and relationships is a key factor of achieving implementation of
goals. As “achieving national policy goals often depends on cooperation between two orders of
government,” the same applies between local-level influences (Inscho, Durfee, 1995). “The ease
with which groups can find like-minded coalition partners” (Dusso, 2008) is considered a group
resource. “In a fundamental sense, most decision-related behavior prior to the decision itself
involves attempts by decision-makers to remove uncertainty through communication with each
other and with actors outside the decisional group” (Kirkpatrick, Davis, Robertson, 1976).
This highlights the importance of including the amount of collaboration partners as a metric from
the case studies for my methods.
Accountability
Candler and Dumont (2010) remark that “non-profits face a wide array of stakeholders to
whom they need to consider their accountability obligations.” They suggest that non-profits are
accountable to members, clients, constituents, donors, governments, media, staff, its partners and
allies, and the general public. In keeping accountable to these influences, non-profits must also
be accountable for financial resources, volunteer resources, and their reputational capital. Their
actions must also remain accountable to the law, ethics, the group‟s mission, and maintain
legitimacy (Candler, Dumont, 2010). Finally, non-profits must remember that the “goods and/or
services” of their actions have quantifiable impacts on their community. Candler and Dumont
also note that while non-profits consistently felt the responsibility to account for their use of
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financial resources; they did not feel a responsibility to account their “reputational capital” to the
government specifically. The fine line between these carries larger implications. It suggests that
non-profits tend to maintain accountable finances for legality reasons while not tending to care as
much about the opinions of governments on their actions, as long as they are legal.
Motivations
Scholars have thoroughly researched the behavior of LLCM and much of the results boil
down to factors of motivation. Kluvers and Tippet, among others have attempted to define why
people choose to work in the non-profit sector despite being paid less than their private-sector
counterparts (2009). “Behavioral and social scientists argue that motivation is the driving force
behind behavior change” (Schultz, 2011). In the background research of their study, it was
evident “how important employee identification with the organisation‟s goals and values were to
the achievement of the organisation‟s mission” (Kluvers, Tippet, 2009). More research shows
that non-profit “staff tend to be motivated by the values and mission of their organization”
(Kluvers, Tippet, 2009). So if staffs are typically both motivated and identify with an
organization‟s mission, it can lead to quality results.
Quality is an evident theme in this work, something that applies to understanding local-level
behavior and performance. Research has:
“found that financial incentives have a strong relationship with performance.
They found that financial incentives were particularly powerful with respect to
performance quantity, but that results were uncertain when regarding performance
quality – an important consideration in the human services sector, and the
essential aspect of this research: what motivates employees in the non-profit
sector, where performance quality is all-important in the work” (Kluvers, Tippet,
2009).
The expectations of many Ontarians are that CAs are responsible for leading water quality
restoration, planting trees, and protecting natural areas. The legislated responsibilities of CAs are
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quite broad and as a result, CAs have grown their activities and policies to a point where their
actions overlap with government agencies. Inefficiencies and public confusion have occasionally
resulted (Shrubsole, 1996). According to Charness, et al, salience is necessary for group
membership to be affective (2007). This drives much of local-level mechanism activity. For
example,
For instance, when inadequate efforts were forthcoming from provincial agencies
concerning diffuse source pollution control, the UTRCA convinced its member
municipalities to support some projects. The key elements in achieving success
related to demonstrating that a significant problem existed and showing that the
conservation authority was capable of addressing it. In this manner, conservation
authority initiatives outside core mandate areas are legitimized, in large part,
through strong municipal support. Without visible „top-down‟ provincial
commitment, integrated water management could be initiated through these
„grassroots‟ efforts (Shrubsole, 1996).
Motivations are also proven to be variable but not dependent on nationalities and cultures. This is
evident from the work of Gelfan, et al who found that “Culturally heterogeneous teams
performed as or more effectively as homogenous teams when leaders help to prevent
communication breakdowns” (2007). They argue further though, that the perspectives of
indigenous influences are “critical for organizational behavior,” something especially relevant in
the Great Lakes considering that there are over 200 Native American, metis, and tribal
governments in the region.
V. Case Studies
The following are three case studies of three different forms of LLCM. The Tip of the
Mitt Watershed Council is a community formed non-profit organization. The Muskegon
Conservation District is a state formed conservation effort organized around a political
community, Muskegon County. Lastly, the Upper Thames River Conservation Authority is a
provincially legislated body, organized geographically around watersheds, that is formed at the

28

Eriksen 2012
behest of the communities located within its watershed‟s borders. The subtle and obtuse
differences lead to differing methods and results, revealed through examples of their respective
programs and projects. Certain metrics are utilized in order to appropriately relate the
comparisons of the three forms of LLCM. The three basic metrics used are funding use and
sources, partnership building, and accountability.
a. Department of Environmental Quality/Tip of the Mitt Watershed Council –
Petoskey, Michigan, United States

Figure 3. TOM Service Area
The Tip of the Mitt Watershed Council is a non-profit organization in Northern Michigan
that covers the four northern counties of Antrim, Cheboygan, Charlevoix, and Emmet. The Tip
of the Mitt Watershed Council, founded in 1979, celebrated its 30th year in 2009 as the lead
organization for water resources protection in Northern Michigan. Their service area includes,
over 1,800 lakes, including some of the largest in the state, over 2,500 miles of rivers and
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streams, and 339,000 acres of wetlands. Within this service area, according to the Michigan
Senate Fiscal Agency, is a population of 108,000 living in the four counties. The organization
has gained large recognition for its presence in the state‟s water resources discussions. Recently,
TOM has emerged as a leading educator on hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, for fossil fuel
resources. Continuing to build strong local and regional partnerships, such as with the
University of Michigan and its northern biological station or the Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality, remains an instrumental element of TOM‟s success.
TOM has been systematically performing a Local Ordinance Gaps Analysis project for
each of the four counties in its service area. “The purpose is to evaluate existing zoning
ordinances against what should be in place to best protect water resources, and offer
recommendations and suggested actions to help local government strengthen areas that need
improved” (TOM, 2012). The project covers county, city, township and village level ordinances.
In the summer of 2011, TOM began the process for Cheboygan County. The presence of the
University of Michigan Biological Station allowed TOM to work through a class that was
offered there that concerned urban and environmental planning. Students in the class were used
to compile the research needed for Cheboygan County. This opportunity allowed TOM to reach
out to the community, get new “volunteers” involved, and perform research without cost.
TOM and the biological station also worked together to “install a demonstration rain
garden” to mitigate water runoff (TOM, 2012). This is a partnership that began with the origins
of TOM and has continued since. They installed a central rain garden that included sandy soils
and deep-rooted wetland plants to facilitate the stormwater‟s infiltration to the ground instead of
letting it carry sediments and nutrients into water sources. Included in the installation was the
creation of a “mini-dune complex complete with sand-loving species” that are native to Northern
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Michigan (TOM, 2012). A large number of other features were implemented to create the overall
demonstration project. It serves as a guide to others in the community and visitors to the
Biological Station. Station staff and volunteers were again central to TOM‟s success with the
project.
Much of the work TOM does is necessarily carried out in advisory roles. Their research
and expertise on water issues has made them an accountable voice in policy formation across the
region. In their own community, the council performs shoreline surveys “to evaluate conditions
or activities along a lake shoreline that could be detrimental to the lake ecosystem and water
quality” (TOM, 2012). The surveys are performed by TOM and the results are shared with
“owners of properties where problems are suspected” (TOM, 2012). This process has been
performed on some of the largest lakes in the area and over 1,000 property owners have been
contacted in a role intended to “inform, educate, and protect.” Those contacted are urged to work
with the council to find solutions to their problems. At this point, questionnaires are given to
those willing to participate. They are designed to reveal the specific property issues that are
affecting the water quality. Upon receiving this information, TOM writes a “hand-tailored
response to every person that returns a questionnaire” (TOM, 2012). This process is intimate on
a level that a government institution would struggle to achieve, but it is also slow, taking
multiple years. The final stage of the process is a site assessment, done only at the request of the
property owner, and settles on a final solution that is custom for each site. The recommendation
is then up to the owner to follow through on. According to TOM, the “shore survey approach to
working with individual property owners has proven to be very effective” (2012). Through
volunteers and committed staff, TOM is able to accountably partner with its community to make
consistently beneficial contribution to Great Lakes water quality.
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TOM has taken up the issue of fracking and as a result of their efforts, has become “the
lead organization for hydraulic fracturing in the state” (TOM, 2011). The organization developed
a fracking update email list to keep its interested audience informed and a Rapid Response
Coalition to influence elected and public officials “in a coordinated manner” (TOM, 2012). Tip
of the Mitt has further developed enough report in environmental policy to have an affective and
influential relationship with the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). The
organization created a “regulatory wish list” in conjunction with over 30 other Michigan
organizations that was sent to the DEQ. The list identified “changes that are needed to our
regulatory system to ensure that hydraulic fracturing is done in a sustainable manner to protect
our resources” (TOM, 2012). The DEQ responded quickly to one of the wish list‟s concerns that
addressed water withdrawals. The Department began requiring fracking operators to use a Water
Withdrawal Assessment Tool to attempt to avoid the negative impacts of water withdrawals. The
DEQ also offered, at the request of TOM, an “explanation of the process they use evaluating
water withdrawals and site specific reviews” (TOM, 2012). TOM‟s efforts have also pushed the
DEQ to issue new Permitting Instructions and to institute new information posting policies. As a
trial, the DEQ began to post Material Safety Data Sheets when they become available. These
sheets include some of the chemicals used in the process of fracking. Full chemical usage
transparency is a goal of TOM‟s in regards to fracking. As a result of their relationship with the
DEQ, which is built on their reputation of quality, TOM has been able to slowly implement
water quality improvements.
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b. Muskegon Conservation District/White Lake Public Advisory Council –
Muskegon County, Michigan, United States

Figure 4. Muskegon Conservation District Service Area
Muskegon Conservation District (MCD) is a conservation district for Muskegon County
along the eastern shore of Lake Michigan and was established in 1938. According to the
Michigan Senate Fiscal Agency, Muskegon County had a population of 172,000 in 2010. Within
its service area is White Lake, one of the 43 Area of Concerns (AOCs) enumerated by the
GLWQA. Industrial and municipal pollution were the primary sources that affected the water
quality of White Lake. Recently, White Lake made tremendous progress in the remediation of its
pollution. The lake‟s delisting as an AOC will happen in the next couple of years. The process by
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which MCD made this happen is detailed and evaluated through their relationship with the White
Lake Public Advisory Council (WLPAC).
The lake was designated as an AOC in 1985 but some efforts were made prior to that. In
1974, the industrial and municipal discharges were diverted to the county wastewater system.
Wastewater systems were significant to the GLWQA‟s objectives. Some remediation efforts
were also performed towards soil and groundwater issues left by a Hooker Chemical facility in
the early 1980s as well. After its AOC listing in 1985, it took Michigan two years to develop the
original RAP for White Lake. The creation of a plan inspired “little action” and “as a result local
citizens became involved” (Cabala, 2012). The White Lake Public Advisory Council was formed
in 1992. It immediately began to work in partnership with state and federal environmental
agencies in attempts to draw attention to the issues at White Lake. As a result of this partnership
building, eight of a possible fourteen significant problems were identified, problems known as
Beneficial Use Impairments (BUIs). These impairments were found to be causing “significant
changes to White Lake‟s ecology, water quality, and economic vitality” (Cabala, 2012). The
White Lake Public Advisory Council is administratively and technically guided by the MCD. It
primarily works with the Great Lakes Commission, the U.S. EPA and the Michigan Department
of Environmental Quality. Over the last 20 years since the public advisory council‟s creation, a
lot of concentrated efforts and studies have been carried out. A new RAP was developed in 1995
in light of new evaluations. Contaminated sediments left over from a tannery were investigated
that same year and were removed in 2002. The next year, more contaminated sediments that
were a result of a Hooker Chemical outfall were removed. From 2006 to 2010, participating
parties spent a lot of time planning and developing goals and criteria to address the BUIs
identified in 1992. A number of other small projects continued to slowly chip away at the large
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scale issues of White Lake. In 2011, the White Lake Shoreline Habitat Restoration Project began
and the restrictions placed on dredging were officially removed.
The White Lake AOC has begun to move steadily towards delisting. The Muskegon CD
and its Public Advisory Council have turned to addressing the remaining BUIs one by one. As
each one is evaluated and checked off by government agencies, the site can continue to get closer
to full remediation.
c. Upper Thames River Conservation Authority – London, Ontario, Canada

Figure 5. UTRCA Service Area
The UTRCA is one of 36 conservation authorities in the Canadian province of Ontario.
Their area of jurisdiction – the upper watershed of the Thames River – covers 3,432 square
kilometres and is home to around 485,000 people (UTRCA, 2004). The Thames River watershed
encompasses both rural and urban communities, such as Stratford and London. A total of 17
municipalities are within the watershed. The UTRCA was the sixth Authority formed in Ontario,
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created by Order in Council during September of 1947. The watershed is mainly rural except for
the larger urban centers of London, Stratford and Woodstock and has a total population of
approximately 485,000. Agriculture is the main component of the landscape with approximately
3,600 farms, including over 2,000 livestock operations (UTRCA). The River itself has been
identified by the IJC as “one of the largest sources of nutrients in Lake Erie, second only to
Ohio‟s Maumee River” (UTRCA, 2004). Such a high capacity for Great Lakes water quality
impacts makes this CA a good choice to study. “The Conservation Authority takes a
subwatershed approach in its monitoring and remediation programs,” with the Upper Thames
River watershed divided into 28 subwatersheds, which are “a manageable size for monitoring
and targeting remedial work” (UTRCA, 2004). Such size allowed the identification of the
Dingman Creek Weir as a project to improve water resource and ecosystem quality. The UTRCA
also likes the subwatershed approach because they “are also a manageable scale for the public.
Landowners and interest groups can identify with their local creek or stretch of the Thames”
(UTRCA, 2004).
Dams and other similar structures have adverse effects that “include barring migration of
fish and wildlife, increasing soil deposition and erosion, altered water quantity and quality,
eutrophication, and wildlife mortality” (UTRCA, 2004). For these reasons, the UTRCA project
to remove the Dingman Creek Weir was chosen for this case study. The GLWQA specifically
concerns water quality and the agreement‟s creation was partially in response to the
eutrophication that nearly killed Lake Erie. The UTRCA has identified around 175 structures
through the Thames River Watershed Barriers Assessment program. The program follows a set
of developed criteria in order to rank the “impoundments” for their removal or mitigation. The
criteria considers the impoundments‟ current function, age, structural integrity, and impacts on
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the aquatic ecosystem (UTRCA, 2004). The Dingman Creek Weir was over fifty years old, had
begun to fall apart, and no longer served its original purpose, and as a result, became the top
priority under the Assessment program. The funding for the project was provided by the UTRCA
and their partnership with the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources. This partnership is
established under the Canada-Ontario Agreement Respecting the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem.
The city of London, who owns the land around the weir, participated with the UTRCA to
perform a Municipal Class Environmental Assessment (EA). The EA was performed with the
goals of public safety and liability, aquatic health, and the site‟s value to the community in mind.
In the process, local area residents, stakeholders, and local agencies were all consulted with on
various options of addressing the weir. “The preferred option that came out of the EA process,
which included public input, is to completely remove the weir” and fall 2005 was targeted as a
removal date. After the EA was finished in the spring of 2005, with the final recommendation of
complete removal, the results were released to the community. The EA was also dispersed
through the local media and a physical copy was mailed to those who responded to the initial
notice of the project. The project was then approved after no significant obstacles were raised
during this process. The final plan of implementation was to decommission and remove the weir,
rehabilitate the stream channel with natural channel design, and restore the channel and bank.
The initial cost of removing the weir was estimated at $15,000. This excluded the time
and cost of acquiring the necessary permits, to perform the EA, and to prepare and review design
alternatives for the creek restoration post weir removal. Much of these additional costs consisted
of staff time. Aside from the EA, permits and approvals were needed from the Ontario Ministry
of Natural Resources, Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Fisheries and Oceans Canada,
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Transport Canada, the City of London, and the UTRCA. UTRCA staff controlled pedestrian and
other traffic in the construction area to ensure public health and safety.
The crew responsible for the project spent a day clearing a lane through an area marked
as low impact vegetation in order to allow the mechanical equipment access to the site. The
participating coordinators of the project hired a professional arborist to guide the clearing of this
vegetation. Since the fall is typically a period of lower stream flow, September was chosen to
completely remove the weir. In the meantime, as much of the weir that was above water level
was removed to minimize the amount of sediments and debris released into the stream. The river
stones that were to be used as part of the stream restoration after the weir‟s removal were put to
use during the removal process as well. The stones were used as a foundation for the excavator
and backhoe to work off in order to keep them out of the water. This allowed the project to cut
costs and keep more mechanical wastes out of the water. To keep a historical reminder of the
weir‟s place in the community, portions that did not block any of the stream were preserved. The
physical removal of the weir took three days.
Post weir removal, the rehabilitation process of the stream channel took over. The same
stones used as an operating base for the heavy equipment was redistributed along the channel
around the weir in order to create a riffle pattern. The pattern was designed to maintain an area
wide enough to ensure access for stream watercraft. The stream banks up and downstream of the
weir were shaped to be consistent with the rest of the stream. This included the planting of new
vegetation and trees to stabilize the reconstructed shores. The site continues to be monitored.
Any new construction or other general changes in the area trigger an inspection of the project
site. Further, the UTRCA‟s annual sampling program continues to perform benthic and fish
sampling. The CA‟s website offers a comprehensive detailing of the project.
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VI. Discussion
Tip of the Mitt Watershed Council, Muskegon Conservation District, and the Upper
Thames River Conservation Authority clearly operate in differing scopes and functions. TOM
with the most scattered (and smallest) constituency across four counties, MCD with a
concentrated but larger population in one county, and UTRCA with a diverse population
centered within one watershed but 17 municipalities. TOM is a non-governmental non-profit,
reliant on a concerned audience. MCD is a government created conservation arm at the countywide, local level, reliant on its populace for direction. UTRCA is also a government legislated
body in Ontario, designed to operate within communities at the watershed level, and reliant on
local initiative. The differences evident from the case studies can be analyzed through four basic
measures of group effectiveness. The results are then applicable to analysis in measurement of
their efforts in effective implementation of the GLWQA‟s goals.
a. Results
Funding
Tip of the Mitt Watershed Council‟s funding is made very transparent through its annual
reports. During the 2010 year, 93% percent of their Operating Fund Revenue and Support was
from unrestricted contributions and grants. Only 3% was from investment revenue, with another
3% from contract services. This funding situation clearly dictates the manner in which the
organization is motivated to perform. Line by line funding of initiatives does not lend any
assurance for future efforts, despite TOM‟s proven track record of success. So in response, TOM
is very vocal, very socially active, and provides very thorough, accessible, and presentable
accounting of its actions. This has made the organization focused in its projects in order to
remain consistent to its mission.
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Information about funding is consistently vague or not available for MCD. The
conservation districts are eligible for available grants and state funds. It is up to the CD to
determine what sources are relevant to their efforts and follow through. The MCD does not offer
reports of their budgets or directly detail their efforts with the White Lakes Public Advisory
Council. All information on the restoration of the AOC at White Lake is provided by the
Council, with no monetary details.
The conservation authority was also able to directly fund its project through existing
revenues and partnerships, instead of having to rely on grants or donations or new partnerships,
something the non-profit continually faced. The UTRCA has a much different fiscal scenario
than TOM or MCD. It was able to reliably budget 48% of its own direct revenue through
permits, fees, and other recreational activities for 2012. Another 19% is projected to come from
contract services, 3% from the Ministry of Natural Resources, and the final 30% would come
from the municipalities within the CA. Their total budget for 2012 is forecast to be nearly $12
million, which is actually down from years previous. Their detailed budget separates allocations
toward its different services and programs. These include flood/water & erosion control,
environmental planning, watershed planning, environmental monitoring, research, soil
conservation, the Clean Water Program, forestry, conservations areas, etc. Another key area
outlined in the 2012 budget is specifically for community partnerships. The UTRCA states that
they strive to “motivate watershed residents to adopt stewardship by facilitating 1) access to
environmental and conservation information, and 2) involvement in stewardship activities”
(UTRCA, 2012). The organization‟s ability to count on guaranteed sources of money through
government funds allow it to maintain a large operation and staff and directly fund its own
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projects in the absence of partnerships. This allows it to move beyond the capacity of strictly an
advisor and into the realm of implementation.
Ontario and its Conservation Authorities have a form of provincial-municipal costsharing/funding structure and as a result, a relationship incorporating multiple mechanism levels,
from local to agency to province. Such relationships may be valuable and crucial but reliability is
never guaranteed. “The 1982 COA, for example, provided for federal funds in the amount of $65
million (Canadian), to be paid over three years. Then in the late 1980s, the federal government
removed itself from such municipal infrastructure funding” (Inscho, Durfee, 1995). This same
issue of federal unreliability however may be the greater issue. Both the United States and
Canada have failed to consistently follow through on their GLWQA responsibilities. According
to Fischer, et al “Sustainable resource use can result from economic institutions that follow
certain design principles, related to, among other things, clear boundaries, collective choice
arrangements…” (2012), two principles that form the foundation of Conservation Authorities in
Ontario. For example, conservation authorities are principally guided by watershed orientation, a
clear geographical boundary.
Partnerships
The non-profit excelled in partnership building and community outreach, something
integral to its function and survival. The conservation district worked well with government
agencies but very slowly. How long the clean-up process would have taken without the
involvement of the district and its public advisory council is unknown, but it is evident their
involvement sped up the process dramatically. The UTRCA and TOM both excel at utilizing
volunteers in its projects. Important since “conservation volunteers in highly participatory
projects report higher levels of learning about how to achieve conservation outcomes and how to
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work collaboratively than do those in less participatory projects” (Fischer, et al, 2012).
Remaining consistent allows TOM to build evolving partnerships and stay connected and salient
to its community. In the absence of a partnership or grant for a given project or objective
however, the council is forced to remain in an advisory capacity. This advisory capacity proved
to be effective however, especially in its relationship with the DEQ. Tip of the Mitt‟s established
reputation as a producer of quality research and work allowed it to work in a give-and-take
relationship with the state of Michigan department. The DEQ respected the information provided
by TOM and used it to make quick policy changes regarding fracking and water quality.
The MCD acts as a fairly passive enabler in the case of White Lake‟s clean-up efforts.
Essentially, it facilitates the local citizenry‟s self-organization and efforts through its
administrative support. This form of partnership is certainly functional to a certain extent, but
with clear limitations. Its ability to influence policy and water quality implementation efforts is
limited in this case to an administrative aid. MCD‟s ability to drive policy and water quality
implementation efforts is also limited. The organization acts in a reactionary capacity instead of
an initiative one.
The conservation authority excelled at both partnership building and community
outreach. It was very clear from their annual reports and other published materials that
community participation and volunteer work were important to UTRCA. The CA felt that
participation was important for educational reasons, especially in creating a working knowledge
base among landowners, along with establishing conservation ideals in youth volunteers. There
was less emphasis on the need for partnership building based on a fiscal motivation. Where TOM
may possibly need the contributions of volunteers in order to influence a project, UTRCA has the
flexibility to drive efforts.
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Accountability
In terms of public access and thus accountability, TOM and UTRCA easily outperform
MCD. Both TOM and UTRCA are actively engaged with the community through recreation
efforts, events, education campaigns, media outreach, and reporting. Documents of budgets and
activities are readily accessible through both of their websites with direct contact information.
The MCD maintains a site, but it is nowhere near as thorough as the others‟. The entire
conservation district network in Michigan is lacking in this area as well, at least in terms of
modern accessibility. While the quality of accountability seen in the case of MCD does not speak
for the entire Conservation District network in Michigan, it is still noteworthy and indicative of
the overall depth of the mechanism.
Motivations
Since motivation is the driving force behind behavior change, and individuals have a
stronger motivation to respond to pressing issues at the local level, a prevalent non-profit in a
community is uniquely positioned to encourage conservation behavior. The non-profit can
organically utilize their altruistic and intrinsic motivation factors. The non-profit can also
incorporate an individual‟s “stronger sense of personal responsibility” into its objectives,
creating innate accountability in its work. This also favors non-profits in terms of partnership
building.
The same lesson can be applied to the conservation district. Where TOM was prevalent in
its community, MCD appeared much less so. As a result, its ability to influence, encourage, or
drive conservation behavior is limited. The motivations in the conservation district are
interesting. It is not motivated by a need of survival like the non-profit that counts on continued
annual support. To an extent, the conservation district is simply there; created as a government
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arm, ready to be available when enough citizen self-organization drives its involvement. It is also
not as motivated by a need to increase its funding sources.
The UTRCA‟s mandate and fiscal situation has influenced it and other conservation
authorities to create their own revenue streams. Its conservation efforts are clearly guided at least
in part by monetary motivations. While some extent of government funding is guaranteed, along
with the municipal tax levies that are required for a conservation authorities existence, a large
portion of their mandated responsibilities require additional funding. As a result, conservation
authorities have expanded their efforts and operational scope (not geographically) as a way to
create such funds. This has evolved into Conservation Areas where the institution collects
revenue from permits, fees, and services. So the conservation authorities are partially not
motivated by monetary factors as well. Over time, their ability to create their own source of
funding has allowed UTRCA to focus on project implementation, as seen in the Dingman Creek
Weir removal.
Goals of the GLWQA
The Great Lakes Water Quality agreement is expansive and sets very laudable goals for
water quality. Among those, a few key objectives are reflective of the agreement‟s intentions.
The three used in this analysis are the goal to make the Great Lakes: 1) free of pollution sources
that are either directly or indirectly caused by humans; 2) free of nutrients that accumulate to
interfere with the beneficial uses of the water; and 3) free of unsightly debris or floating material
affecting water quality. While “free of” implies total removal of pollution, nutrients, etc., this
analysis considers improvements in these areas an indicator of effectiveness. The three case
studies reveal differing levels of effectiveness in achieving these goals.
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TOM worked with the University of Michigan Biological Station to analyze gaps in its
service area‟s policies and ordinances where water quality could be improved. It has also worked
directly with the DEQ to improve water quality regulatory standards in relation to the fracking
industry. Its policy achievements have improved the awareness of water quality issues related to
fracking, but have not directly improved water quality. There have certainly been other efforts by
the organization that have cleaned up water pollution sources, as seen in their shoreline survey
projects. MCD‟s work with the WLPAC has definitely improved water quality in the White Lake
AOC. However, their results are not a direct function of their efforts as the WLPAC took much
of the initiative in this case. Regardless, it is hard to deny the quantifiable improvements made as
more BUIs are removed and the site moves closer to delisting as an AOC. The UTRCA‟s
Dingman Creek Weir removal project directly improved water quality. The weir was affecting
ecosystem function and contributing sediment to a river system polluting the Great Lakes.
TOM‟s community outreach in its shoreline survey projects definitely reduced the
amount of nutrients entering waters. Its work with DEQ on fracking however has not reduced
nutrient runoff directly. MCD, working with the WLPAC, made considerable improvements in
reducing beneficial use impairments that were a result of human industrial pollution. Less
improvement was made in actual nutrient remediation though, since much of the focus in this
case was on the industrial wastes. The removal of the Dingman Creek Weir and the subsequent
restoration of the stream bed and shoreline dramatically improved the nutrient and sediment
loads in the watershed. The natural restoration that improved the ecosystem function facilitated
the natural filtering of further nutrients out of the water.
TOM‟s shoreline survey project helped identify polluting debris and materials entering
waters from properties. Most of the results here were of the nutrient variety though and less so of
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physical debris. Their efforts with DEQ to influence fracking regulations and operations in
Michigan certainly have the potential to prevent future debris and material entering and polluting
water sources though. MCD„s support of WLPAC allowed the removal of industrial waste
deposits, sediments, and tailings that were unsightly and polluting to Great Lakes water quality.
The UTRCA removed the Dingman Creek Weir that was a concrete eyesore. It was a human
created object that was deteriorating quickly and contributing debris to the watershed. Its
removal illustrates a successful example of effective implementation of water quality
improvement strategies.
b. Conclusions
In the end, both the non-profit and the conservation authority showed a demonstrated
ability to implement water quality improving initiatives consistently. The conservation district
itself did so, but not in an accountable way. Since it performed mostly as an administrative aid, it
made no effort to broadcast its efforts directly. The non-profit proved better, out of necessity, at
forming partnerships and finding funding of the three organizations. The conservation authority
demonstrated good partnership building as well, but it was not as prevalent as the non-profit‟s.
The conservation authority was also best at generating its own funding revenues. The non-profit
and conservation authority both demonstrated consistent accountability as well through annual
reports, budgets, and transparency. The conservation district lacked accountability in all of these
ways. It is not possible to definitively say whether one of these three local-level conservation
mechanisms has the greatest capacity in regards to implementing the GLWQA. What is clear
though is that both the non-profit and conservation authority outperformed the conservation
district in the given case study. Also, and most importantly, local-level conservation mechanisms
have proven to play a considerable role in effectively implementing the GLWQA. The
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Muskegon Conservation District was involved in pushing the White Lake Area of Concern
closer to delisting. Tip of the Mitt Watershed Council has grown into a voice recognizable
around the Great Lakes Basin and has influenced countless policies at the local, state, and
international level that improve water quality. The Upper Thames River Conservation Authority
has made improvements to the water quality and ecological functions of the streams and systems
within its watershed, a watershed that has been a large polluter of Great Lakes water historically.
Local-level involvement should become increasingly prevalent in order to create further
implementation of environmental policy.
c. Limitations of Study
The difficulty in reducing the variation within the comparisons reduced the ability to
apply consistent data throughout this work. It is always difficult to quantify metrics like
motivation and partnership building. As a result, there was no way to definitively value the
effectiveness of local-level conservation mechanisms. The diversity of non-profits makes
looking at only one problematic. The same can be said of conservation districts/authorities as
well. Not all conservation districts are as shallow as Muskegon‟s seemed to be. Further research
can be done to investigate what can be done specifically to streamline such mechanisms. Since
so much analysis came down to accountability from the organizations, a lack of accountability in
one place affected the comparative aspects of the rest of the study. Spatial and temporal
contextual variables define the limitations to this study. Moving forward, the results presented in
this study still provide insight into water conservation efforts in relation to water quality
improvements.
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a. Timeline

1909: Boundary Waters Treaty
1946: Conservation Authorities Act
1972: Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
1978: Renewal of Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
1985: Great Lakes Charter
1986: U.S. Water Resources Development Act
1987: Protocol to Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
2001: Great Lakes Charter Annex
2005: Great Lakes – St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Sustainability Agreement &
Compact (U.S. singed in 2008)
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b. Organizational Relationships and Intersections Flow Chart
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c. Organization Mission Statements
Tip of the Mitt Watershed Council:
The Tip of the Mitt Watershed Council speaks for Northern Michigan's waters.
We are dedicated to protecting our lakes, streams, wetlands, and groundwater
through respected advocacy, innovative education, technically sound water
quality monitoring, thorough research and restoration actions. We achieve our
mission by empowering others and we believe in the capacity to make a positive
difference. We work locally, regionally and throughout the Great Lakes Basin to
achieve our goals (2012).
Muskegon Conservation District:
The Muskegon Conservation District is a unique governmental subdivision of the
state created to serve as stewards of our natural resources. The guiding philosophy
is that local people should make decisions on conservation issues at the local
level, with technical assistance provided by local resource professionals. District
projects and programs are as diverse as the landscape and are continually
changing to meet the environmental challenges in local communities. We are here
for YOU (2012).
Upper Thames River Conservation District:
Since 1946, the mandate of the Conservation Authorities has been defined in Section 20
of the Provincial Conservation Authorities Act: "to establish and undertake, in the area in which
it has jurisdiction, a program designed to further the conservation, restoration, development and
management of natural resources other than gas, oil, coal and minerals."
The objectives of Ontario‟s 36 Conservation Authorities are:
 to

ensure that Ontario‟s rivers, lakes and streams are properly safeguarded, managed and
restored;
 to protect, manage and restore Ontario‟s woodlands, wetlands and natural habitat;
 to develop and maintain programs that will protect life and property from natural hazards
such as flooding and erosion;
 to provide opportunities for the public to enjoy, learn from and respect Ontario‟s natural
environment.
The UTRCA‟s mission statement is "Inspiring a healthy environment."

56

